A few years ago I was in a faraway land known as Afghanistan. The specific time and place I cannot say, and isn’t relevant to my point anyway. An Afghan security officer was tasked with upgrading security for his base’s headquarters’ section and more specifically the base commander, to protect against the insider threat. He requested assistance from US forces and, being that my section was involved in threat assessments and counterterrorism, we were tasked with assisting him. We had been training the Afghan army for about ten years, we thought they should be conducting business in the same manner as the U.S. Army… we were wrong.

Our assessment was horrific, security personnel without protection or communication, parking areas right outside senior officer offices, open air breezeways with no protection, very little traffic control, and unlimited access to the building. This was going to be an interesting job.

As we got into planning we were given three rules we had to incorporate into the plan, all three were non-negotiable.

1. Be discrete. They didn’t want the commander to look like he was hiding or afraid. They thought it would make him look weak in front of his men. Thus, making the place look like a fortress was out.
2. Keep the cost low. They were restricted in resources and money. We were constrained to supplies and equipment they had on hand. If we couldn’t scrounge it locally, then they probably couldn’t get it.
3. Don’t mess with the roses.

Wait… what? What do roses have to do with anything? One could see the other requests, but what does a flower garden have to do with protecting the building? Well, as their chief of staff tolerantly explained, roses are a symbol of success for the Afghan Army. Removing or damaging the rose garden in front of the building would have roughly the same effect as making the commander look weak. They would not compromise their values in the name of security.

This got me to thinking, and subsequently colors my current attitude toward security planning and assessments. First, you should not have to look like you are hiding frightened in your house to have robust security. You shouldn’t have to live with obvious security barriers like bars on the doors and windows, high intensity lights all around, large fences and gates topped with razor wire surrounding your entire perimeter, and generally looking like some kind of fortress. Most people want to present a warm and friendly outlook in the appearance of their house.

Second, it shouldn’t cost a whole lot of money to create a safe environment. Yes, we have the options of high security alarms, monitored and recorded digital video systems, high impact resistant window film, locks costing hundreds of dollars, etc. but if we can have a similar security increase by simply placing a five dollar stop on a window, or a bar in the sliding glass door, or trimming our hedges, then that should be our initial approach to security. Knock out the easy, inexpensive, and effective first. Worry about the other stuff later. Keep it simple.

Lastly we shouldn’t have to give up our values to increase our security, or make major changes in our lifestyle. We can use what we already have, adapt it, and incorporate it into our security plan.

This has become my philosophy, and my approach when it comes to designing a security plan. I believe, if we look hard enough, and do a little outside the box thinking, one can create a plan that is inexpensive, effective, and unobtrusive.

To answer your question, we were able to incorporate the rose garden in the security plan. Later it became indispensable to make our plan work. What began as a challenge became an opportunity.

When conducting an assessment, and creating a subsequent security plan I work with a “defense in depth” concept. Defense in depth creates areas or zones starting from inside the house or business, and building outward (or from the outside looking in if that is your preference). Each zone has its own security considerations and challenges, and will have a perimeter which must be crossed to get into a lower zone before an intruder can reach their target. Items creating the border of can either be psychological, such as indicators of difficulty, they can be deceptive, such as lack of indicators of valuables, or they can be physical, such as higher security locks, strengthened doors, or locked and shatter resistant windows.

One of the key principles of defense in depth is requiring the potential intruder to spend larger amounts of time entering or working inside the premises, and risking greater exposure and chance of getting caught. An intruder will want to spend as little time as possible breaching the house and then less than 10 to 15 minutes actually inside searching and collecting valuables. The short exposure time makes the criminal feel safer as they are typically faster than a police response to a property crime call. If the thief can spend only a few minutes breaching the house and 10 minutes inside they will probably be gone before law enforcement can arrive. If they have to spend more time than that, there is a better chance that they will move on and attempt to enter someplace else. Realizing time and exposure are a factor, we work to maximize both.

For planning considerations in a residential area, I usually use four zones. Businesses may have less or more, depending on their specific situation and location. The number of zones the planner uses is dependent on how the planner is viewing the situation and what is the most convenient. I tend to order the zones from the interior to the exterior, but in this case we’ll discuss them in the order a potential intruder will encounter them. It should be noted the zones can be called anything you wish. Lacking imaginative labels, I simply use one through four.

Outside of your perimeter Zone Four:

Zone four consists of everything in your neighborhood outside of your actual property line. Within this zone are factors you may or may not be able to control or affect. However, threats in zone four may be effectively controlled by working with your neighbors, your housing association, building managers, other area businesses, or local law enforcement agencies. Other than cooperative efforts of the entire neighborhood, the most one may be able to hope for is monitoring situations and reporting possible criminal activity. Awareness of activity in one’s area may increase security for the entire neighborhood.

This is also the zone where a potential intruder will survey the premises and determine if there are valuables worth taking and if it is safe enough to attempt a break in. Trash with indicators of recent purchases, un-secured mail, and high ticket items such as boats, jet skis, or ATVs will aid the intruder. Indicators of open doors and windows, or heavy cover reducing visibility from the street may increase the likelihood of a crime. Lack of these indicators may make the potential intruder check the next location.

Property line to outer wall: Zone Three

Zone three is the area between the outside property line and the actual envelope of the home or business. This may include the yard, driveway, Parking lots, open areas, and fenced in areas. Specific items and deficiencies within zone three can be directly affected by the owner and either modified, eliminated, or repaired. Security is enhanced in zone three through increased physical security measures and direct observation. In some cases, such as apartments or businesses renting space within a shared building, zone three may be very limited or non-existent. This adds a challenge to planning as the only obstacle between zone four’s uncontrolled area and the potential target is the envelope of the structure itself. Lack of visibility into the structure may help deter the intruder due to not being able to determine if there are easily accessed valuables.

In this zone the intruder’s exposure is at its highest. In the fourth zone, they may be just a passer-by, in the second they are inside and less visible. The third zone is where we want to maximize the intruder’s visibility and time.

Outer wall to inner room: Zone Two

Zone two is the area inside the house between the outer envelope and an inner safe room or bedroom. This is the area where a burglar will find most of your valuables. After the outer envelope of the home or business is breached, the intruder is typically able to move easily from room to room and is hidden from outside observation. Items that cannot be found or easily removed within the 10-15 minute window may be abandoned. The burglar may find things in this area, such as keys, that may not be of immediate use, but may be used on a return burglary. He might also see something a very high-value that he cannot to remove immediately and may come back with proper tools or help to extract the item.

Protection of zone two is typically through alarm systems and securing valuable items in areas that are difficult to find or in security containers which are bolted to floors or walls to prevent easy removal. Other options may include stronger interior locks or hidden areas to increase the time the burglar spends in order to conduct a search. Anything which frustrates the intruder during his activities uses time and keeps him from conducting a thorough and effective search.

Zone two is also important because this is where the family may be during the course of a violent home intrusion, or employees during a robbery. Plans must be in place to move people quickly to a safe area in the case of an intruder forcing their way into the building. This will require creating a plan, and practicing a quick response to the threat.

Inner room: Zone One

Zone one is an inner room inside the home or business which may be hardened against an invasion attempt. Typically the area will be an inner room or office, or the master bedroom. This is not to be confused with a “safe room” which is a hardened structure made for long duration safety. The purpose of the zone one room is to create time, to help protect the people, repel the invader long enough to summon law enforcement, and possibly defend the household if required. This inner room may have a number of small improvements, but is fundamentally a product of the homeowner’s security planning. Some improvements for zone one may incur a substantial, many do not.

Response to the intrusion needs to be a planned addition to the security plan and will be what fits the homeowner and family the best. This may not include a violent response to the intrusion, but must include a means to contact outside help. There is the possibility that, in the case of a burglary, the intruder will have no interest in breaching the door or confronting the homeowner, and will leave when he realizes the family is awake, aware of his presence, and has contacted the police.

These zones, and the factors within them are merely a starting point for planning, and not an all-inclusive list. The planner should feel free to adjust the zones as they fit the specific circumstances, and discard the ones that don’t seem to apply. A zone doesn’t even have to be physical. One could create a “cyber” zone to focus on networking and communication issues. All defense in depth really does is aid our planning efforts by allowing us to focus on smaller areas of similar security concerns. Once we determine our zones, we can begin to address factors within the zone to deter an offender, or increase his exposure and chances of detection.